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MOLAR MOTIONS IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Roger Paul Peters*
Judges do and must legislate.1 This is a commonplace, but the propo-
sition still seems scandalous to those who naively suppose that the doctrine
of separation of powers demands that the legislative, executive and judicial
powers must be kept in watertight compartments. The celebrated jurist who
announced the proposition warns us, however, that judges can legislate only
interstitially; "they are confined from molar to molecular motions." He goes
on and supplies at least two examples of what he considered to be molar motions
and hence not to be permitted:
A common-law judge could not say I think the doctrine of con-
sideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in
my court. No more could a judge exercising the limited jurisdiction
of admiralty say I think well of the common law rules of master
and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc.2
Today the charge is frequently made that the present Supreme Court of
the United States has usurped the legislative function. In other words it
has not been confined from molar to molecular motions. Decisions have
been rendered which drastically changed the law. The clearest examples of
such alleged usurpation are, of course, the decisions in the School Segregation
Cases.' That in the matter of school segregation great changes have been
effected in the law cannot reasonably be denied. Indeed, many other changes
of a significant nature are made in every term of the Supreme Court.
The question to be discussed is whether these changes are of so extensive
a character that they are rightfully beyond the province of the judiciary.
This is no easy question. The answer proposed herein is in the negative.
The Court, it seems to this writer, has in the School Segregation Cases exer-
cised its well-established historical functions. Far-reaching the decisions in
those cases assuredly are, but are the motions molar in the forbidden sense?
In an attempt to show that they are not, consideration will be given to certain
well-known episodes in the history of the Court. These episodes relate to
(1) the manner in which the First Amendment freedoms became "incor-
porated" in the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) the results of the so-called
constitutional revolution of the 1930's, (3) certain important constitutional
decisions of a highly controversial nature, particularly the Slaughterhouse
Cases' and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.' Finally, the resulting conclusion will be
stated.
* LL.B.; Professor of Constitutional Law, Notre Dame Law School; member of the
New York and United States Supreme Court Bars.
1 Holmes, J., dissenting in Southern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
2 Ibid.
3 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), holding in effect that racial segregation in public schools throughout
the country must be terminated.
4 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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I
The first of these episodes, as a matter of general interest, concerns the
fundamental freedoms set forth in the First Amendment: freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly and petition.
Although these freedoms are guaranteed to the individual from infringement
by Congress it was not until 1925 that it was discovered that these freedoms
might also be protected by law against infringement by the states.6 To retell
the various events which led to this remarkable turn of affairs would be a work
of supererogation.' There are, however, certain points which should be empha-
sized for the purposes of the present discussion. First, mention should be made
of the great stretches of time involved as compared to the life of an individual
human being. The First Amendment became part of the Constitution along
with other Amendments known as the Bill of Rights in the last decade of the
eighteenth century.' Several generations later, in 1868, after the Civil War,
the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution. During this long
interval only one landmark decision concerning the Bill of Rights (not even
involving the provisions of the First Amendment) came down from the Court.
This was Barron v. Baltimore,9 decided in 1833, in which it was announced
that the provisions of the Fifth Amendment requiring that just compensation
be awarded for property taken for a public purpose did not apply to the states
or their instrumentalities. In 1919, after World War I, the Court had its
unprecedented First Amendment case,'Schenck v. United States.0 The decision
in the case upheld the power of Congress to enact legislation imposing penalties
on those who by speech or writing impeded the operation of the conscription
laws. Congress was held to have the power, despite the seemingly absolute
character of the language of the First Amendment, to pass laws inflicting
punishment for speeches and publications where there is a clear and present
danger of a "substantive evil"" which Congress has the right to prevent, such
as obstruction of the draft. The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Holmes
was unanimous. Several cases followed in which Holmes and Brandeis, in
dissenting opinions, expressed limitations on the power of Congress with respect
to the application of certain wartime legislation to cases in which there ap-
peared to the dissenters to be no "clear and present danger" of substantive
evils.'" The culmination came in 1925 with the case of Gitlow v. New York."
The Court upheld the conviction of the accused under the criminal anarchy
statute of the State of New York because of the publication of the "Left Wing
Manifesto" against objections to the conviction that the New York statute, as
6 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 666 (1925).
We may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press ... are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the states.
7 See generally CHAFEE, THE BLESSING OF LIBERTY (1956); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES (1942).
8 The First Amendment was adopted in 1791.
9 Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1933).
10 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
11 Id. at 52.
12 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
13 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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construed and applied in the case by the State Courts, deprived the defendant
of his liberty of expression in violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Sanford, in his opinion for the Court, stated
the following memorable words:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press - which are protected by the First Amend-
ment from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental
personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
We do not regard the incidental statement in Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment im-
poses no restrictions on the States concerning freedom of speech,
as determinative of this question."
There is general agreement that the first sentence quoted above was momentous.
Although the Court qualified its utterance by use of the phrase "for present
purposes," subsequent decisions of the Court made it clear that the same
assumption was to be made in other cases, not only with respect to freedom of
speech and of the press but also with respect to freedom 'of religion and other
First Amendment freedoms. Later cases speak in terms of the incorporation
of First Amendment freedoms into the liberty protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 That this announcement represented
a change, a motion of some sort can scarcely be denied. Noteworthy in this
connection is the second sentence quoted above, referring to Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Cheek. 6 That case was decided in 1922, only three years before the Gitlow
case. A statute of Missouri required every corporation doing business in the
state to furnish, upon request, to any employee, when discharged or leaving its
service, a letter signed by the superintendent or manager, setting forth the
nature and duration of his service to the corporation and stating truly the cause
of his leaving. The plaintiff, having resigned from employment in the service
of an insurance company, demanded a letter in accordance with the statute,
but the letter was refused. As a result of the refusal the plaintiff was unable
to secure employment and suffered substantial damages. The Supreme Court
affirmed a judgment on verdict for the plaintiff in his action for damages
against the insurance company.
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the Court, and the famous
"incidental statement" made by him for the Court was as follows:
But, as we have stated, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes
upon the States any restrictions about 'Freedom of speech,' of the
'liberty of silence;' nor, we may add, does it confer any right of
privacy upon either persons or corporations.17
Holmes was not among the dissenters in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek.'
He did dissent in Gitlow, but it is clear that he did not object to the assumption
made by the Court with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment. The upshot
14 Id. at 666.
15 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927).
16 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
17 Id. at 543.
18 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
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of all this would seem to be that neither Holmes nbr many other able and
learned men of the law considered the great shift in doctrine inaugurated in
almost a casual fashion by Gitlow to be that sort of molar motion which the
judges should not indulge in. It is true that the Court did not have to over-
rule Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek 9 to be able to assert the famous dictum in
Gitlow. On the other hand, the practice of overruling prior decisions should
not be considered a serious objection on the score of forbidden molar motions,
for such practice was established comparatively early in the history of the
Court, long before Holmes uttered his caveat against molar motions."
One of the arguments frequently advanced against the decisions in the
School Segregation Cases is based upon the fact that Congress had not acted
in the matter. The proponents of this argument say that they are not concerned
with the worthiness of the goal envisioned by the Court, rather they question
the authority of the Court to legislate in the matter. For, they say, the matter
is one of policy for the determination of Congress. They invoke the fifth section
of the Fourteenth Amendment2' as indicating that Congress has the authority
to pass legislation enforcing the provisions of the amendment. Furthermore,
it is argued, Congress was fully aware of the fact that there was segregation
in the schools. Congress had even provided for such segregation with respect
to the District of Columbia; and, it is extremely unlikely that a bill providing
for desegregation would have received enough votes in Congress to become law
even if it escaped a presidential veto.
This is an argument which disturbs many well-intentioned people. It is
submitted, however, that whatever merit this argument seems to have quickly
evaporates, leaving no substance behind, when it is exposed to the rays eman-
ating from the truths of constitutional history.
The truths that are especially significant in this regard are as follows:
First, there is the well-established constitutional doctrine of judicial review.
Marbury v. Madison,2 2 decided in 1803, is the leading case for this proposition.
The Court there held an act of Congress unconstitutional. Since that time, the
Court has repeatedly done this. In Fletcher v. Peck,2" decided in 1810, it held
a state law unconstitutional and has repeatedly held state laws unconstitutional
ever since. The great function of judicial review is an undoubtedly well-
established element of our constitutional law. The Court may make mistakes
in exercising this function. The Court itself has acknowledged that it has been
mistaken, particularly on those occasions when it has overruled its own decisions.
The question it seems, comes down to this: Does the fact that Congress might
have lawfully acted in the matter of racial segregation (or anything else)
preclude action (making new rules, legislation, if you will) on the part of the
court? The correct answer in the light of history is no. Consider for a moment,
the express power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states.
19 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
20 The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) over-
ruling The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
21 Sec. 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."
22 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
23 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
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Congress has enacted a vast amount of legislation in accordance with this power,
yet, long before Congress did this, and right down to the present, the Court
has struck down taxes imposed by states and other laws enacted by the states
as invalid under the Commerce Clause. It has done this even though in most
instances Congress had enacted no legislation in the matter then before the
Court. This practice likewise began early in our history.
It should be noted that the judges of the Supreme Court are not completely
exempt from constitutional control. It is true that in angry dissent, Mr. Justice
Stone once made the famous remark that the only restraint on their actions was
their own self-restraint.24 But is this strictly so? Congress has the power of
impeachment, the power to authorize change in the size of the Court, and the
power to propose Constitutional amendments. It is not generally considered
advisable for Congress to attempt to use the first two powers; and, the third
is very cumbersome. Nevertheless, the powers are there for use in an extreme
situation, and they might well be exercised.
Besides this rather technical constitutional control there is the more practical
control illustrated by our history. It is an accepted principle of sociological
jurisprudence that the positive law which conflicts with the "living law" of the
people will prove ineffective unless the people can be persuaded to change
their "living law".2 The stock example is of course the Eighteenth Amendment
and the Volstead Act26 which were miserable failures because they were contrary
to the living law of the American people. There can be no question that the
change in law effected by the School Segregation Cases would similarly become
a "dead letter" were a majority of the people of the United States opposed to it.
Serious disturbances would occur not only in Arkansas, Louisiana and other
southern states but also, perhaps, in all fifty. The fact, however, seems to be
that the overwhelming majority of Americans believe in condemning the in-
equality of treatment condemned by the Court in the School Segregation Cases.
Inasmuch as the people of all states and localities are also Americans and
committed, one hopes, to the basic principle of equality of all men before law;
they must conform to the law as laid down by the Court until such time as
they can persuade it to reverse itself. That eventuality is, of course, extremely
unlikely. It is unlikely too that the vast majority of Americans will change their
minds. Two considerations lead to this conclusion: 1) The decisions are in
accord with the basic American principle of equality of all men before the law,
and 2) the position of the United States in the world of today composed of
countries most of which have overwhelming non-white populations will as a
practical matter compel (if such a thing were necessary) Americans to hold
fast to their fundamental principle of equality.
Cases before 1954 in which state laws were invalidated under the Fourteenth
Amendment are very numerous, and the Court in those cases decided as it did
without benefit of enabling legislation on the part of Congress. Ironically enough,
24 See dissent in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
25 See generally NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE 44-
56 (1959); NORTHROP, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PRACTICAL POLITICS 4, 8-10
(1960).
26 Concerning national prohibition. 41 Stat. 305 (1919).
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the early legislation passed by Congress, presumably thought by it to conform
to the Fourteenth Amendment, was held invalid by the Court in the Civil
Rights Cases. This fact may well have discouraged Congress to enact legislation
in this area of race relations. Indeed, no "civil rights" legislation came out of
Congress until 1952 2 after the lapse of nearly a century.
In short, if the Court is exercising a well-established function, that is, if its
decision is not molar in the forbidden sense, it is acting lawfully and therefore
cannot be truthfully said to have usurped a congressional function. If it is in
its own yard (or on the common), it cannot be said to be trespassing.
Some critics of the court say that the decisions which (1) permitted
extended exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce, (2) allowed
greater latitude to the states with respect to social and economic legislation,
and (3) afforded protection to individuals against governmental power in the
broad field of personal liberty are to be condemned as contrary to our con-
stitutional principles. In effect it is argued that the Court has repeatedly over-
stepped the bounds of its proper jurisdiction. Is there no other way of de-
termining the validity of the Court's action than through the Court's decisions?
As is pointed out herein, the Court has frequently confessed error. Some
have argued that even when it confessed error it was in error.2" The severest
criticism along such lines comes from members of the Court itself in dissenting
opinions. The Court is composed of human beings and accordingly makes
mistakes. However, the members of the Court have always been lawyers trained
in our system of law. They are persuaded by argument and one of the most
persuasive forms of argument in our system of law is that of judicial precedent.
How else can the Court determine whether a proposed motion is molar rather
than molecular? It is no longer a question of first impression. For generations
now the Court has been legislating, sometimes minutely (clearly interstitially),
at other times quite drastically. In doing so, it has usually served us well. The
other branches, legislative and executive, have protested from time to time but
have eventually consented. Generally the people of the United States have also
consented. When the people have not consented, the Court has gracefully
bowed.2"
II
The second great change in the course of decisions by the Supreme Court
which should be mentioned in considering what is molar in the forbidden sense
is the great change which occurred in 1937, often referred to as a constitutional
revolution. If anything should be considered a molar motion one would think
a revolution would qualify. What was this revolution? During the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century the Court struck down from time to time
many state laws regulating economic affairs because in the Court's opinion such
laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment."0 Attempts to impose limitations by
27 See BARRETT, BRUTON, & HONNOLD, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
786-790 (1959).
28 See 2 CROSSE.EY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 865-874 (1953). Discussing the
case of Erie v. Tompkins.
29 ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61-63 (1951).
30 E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
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state statutes on hours of labor, for example, were regarded as meddlesome
interference by reason of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
During the same era the Court frequently struck down laws enacted by Congress,
purporting to be exercising the commerce power"' or the taxing power,8 2 on
the theory that Congress was also interfering in a meddlesome manner in
matters which were no concern of Congress, but merely of local concern.
The Tenth Amendment was invoked as a limitation on the power of Congress
to regulate commerce among the several states. Congress was held to have
invaded the reserved rights of the states. All this seems a long time ago. In
1937, as is well known, a great shift in the attitude of the Court occurred with
respect to both state and federal power in the matters of regulation of business
and other economic affairs. The crucial cases are West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,"3 concerning state power and N.L.R.B. v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp.,4
concerning congressional power. These cases inaugurated a series of decisions,
some of which expressly overruled prior decisions of recent vintage and older
decisions as well. These later cases had the effect of giving the Court's blessing
to almost any likely exercise of the commerce power in that practically any
such exercise would involve matters "affecting" commerce among the several
states.3 3 Likewise, as to the power of the states to regulate economic affairs,
it would appear that no longer does the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment impose serious limitations on the substantive as distinguished from
the procedural aspects of state legislation regarding such affairs.3 6 This great
shift happened in a time of economic crisis. There were vociferous protests at
the time. Today, however, it would seem that most commentators agree that
the shift was necessary and proper. The Court, it is argued, corrected its own
mistakes. It had read laissez-faire into the Constitution (which it should not
have done)" and later felt obliged to read laissez-faire out of the Constitution.
Would Holmes have condemned the Court for this so-called revolution? It is
not likely that he would have done so, for a good deal of the argument for the
great change under discussion was based on views expressed by Holmes in his
famous dissenting opinions, particularly his great dissent in Lochner v. New
York."s
31 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
32 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
33 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Decided March 29, 1937.
34 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); decided just 2 weeks
after West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) on April 12, 1937.
35 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). -Use of wheat grown on one's own
farm for farm purposes can be federally regulated because such home consumption affects
commerce.
36 CORWIN, INTRODUCTION, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEs. ANNOTATED, XXII-
XXVI (1952) " . . . the substantive doctrine of due process of law does not today sup-
port judicial intervention in the field of social and economic legislation in anything like
the same manner that it did... "
37 Mendelson, On Misunderstanding the Supreme Court, 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 125
(1961). See remarks of Bischoff in CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 84 (1954).
38 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, un-
less it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.
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III
The historic changes in the law effected by the Supreme Court decisions
discussed above have had a salutary influence on the people of the United
States. Protecting personal freedom by legal processes and regulating economic
affairs in the public interest have promoted the American ideals of equality and
freedom. On the other hand other momentous decisions of- the Court have at
worst been contrary to these ideals. Others have been regarded by many judicious
commentators as at best unfortunate in their effects. Most of the decisions in
the former category have been corrected either by the Court itself or by
constitutional amendment. Examples are the Dred Scott 9 case and the great
Income Tax Case,4" both corrected by constitutional amendment, and cases
previously alluded to concerning regulation of economic affairs, corrected by
the Court itself. But a number of uncorrected decisions remain on the books.
Of course, it is argued with respect to these that they correctly state the law.
We are said to be satisfied with them. But are we really? The reader may supply
his own instances. Here let us consider at least two, which because of their
drastic nature are germane to a consideration of alleged molar motions. The
first of these is known as the Slaughterhouse Cases,41 the other, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins."
The former was decided a long time ago and was the first occasion for an
authoritative interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court itself
acknowledged in Twining v. New Jersey,"' the decision has often been criticised,
and many modifications have been made with respect to much that was said
in that case; but, despite all that, the case has had lasting effect in making a
dead letter of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Whether such a result is desirable or not, is not the point. What is
remarkable is the fact that words added to the Constitution by formal amend-
ment44 were construed in such a way as to leave them without practical effect.
Justice Miller, who delivered the opinion of the Court in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, ironically enough, had previously spoken for the Court in Crandall v.
Nevada,45 a case which arose prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In the Crandall case it was held that a tax imposed by Nevada was
invalid because it was levied with respect to persons leaving the state, which
act (leaving the state) was a federal right, privilege or immunity arising from
the very nature of our federal union. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, Miller stated
39 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), holding that the special rights and
privileges of citizens of the U.S. are not extended to Negroes whose ancestors were imported
from Africa as slaves. See Bander, The Dred Scott and Judicial Statesmanship, 6 VILL. L.
Ryv. 514 (1961).
40 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895):
41 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
42 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
44 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law...
U.S.,Const. Amend. XIV. § 1.
45 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 35 (1867).
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that privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States were only those
which exist by reason of the citizen's relation to the federal government. This
was, in other words, the same sort of thing that was protected according to the
Crandall case without the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court further held that the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States do not include fundamental rights such as the
rights of life, liberty and property.4 6 If the Court ever indulged in a molar
motion one would think their decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases would serve
as a horrible example of such molar motion. It is, however, seldom criticized
on that score.
The second instance of drastic treatment of prior law (or what was thought
to be prior law) occurred in the case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." This is a
modem case. The decision came down after Holmes had left the Court and
hence a number of years after he had made his pronouncement concerning
molar motions. Brandeis, speaking for the Court, overruled Swift v. Tyson,48
a case that had stood for nearly a hundred years, 9 but like the Slaughterhouse
Cases decision, had been the subject of severe criticism.5" Brandeis stated that
the Court had in the interval been engaging in unconstitutional activities in
that during the intervening years it had misconstrued the provisions of an Act
of Congress that had been on the books since 1789, namely, that in observing
the laws of the several states in federal courts it had confined itself to the
statutes of the states without considering itself bound by the decisions of the
state courts, particularly in commercial matters. The drastic effect of this
decision is well known. Endless difficulties and anomalies have arisen as a
result of it. Surely this decision is a candidate for the molar category. There is,
however, little popular agitation about it.
IV
In the light of this rapid review of instances in the history of the Supreme
Court of momentous changes in the law which took place for the most part
considerably before 1954, what can we say with reasonable confidence about
the alleged molar changes of that memorable year? Were they of such a nature
as to fall within the forbidden category? If we condemn them as usurpations
of legislative power are we not also bound to condemn most if not all of the
prior instances previously discussed? Many of these, as well as other decisions
of lesser significance, came as a surprise. They were a shock to many people,
even to lawyers, as unexpected. With respect to the School Segregation decisions,
however, the profession and the public were well prepared, as is brought out
by Blaustein and Ferguson in their admirable book on Desegregation and the
Law."' What those authors say will not be repeated here, except to point out
that a series of decisions concerning Negroes in graduate and professional schools
46 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
47 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48 16 Peters 1 (1842).
49 From 1842 until 1938.
50 See 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 865-874 (1953) (where Erie
case discussed).
51 BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAw (1957).
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maintained at public expense definitely prepared the way for the decisions of
1954. However, most important of all - and naturally so - were considerations
of tiuth, justice and common decency. The purpose of this article was not to
explore this more profound level but merely to assess the forbidden molar
character of the School Segregation decisions in historical perspective, or in
more traditional language, in the light of the precedents. It is submitted that
the precedents do not indicate that the Court overstepped the bounds of
legitimate judicial power. On the contrary, the precedents and the course of
decision generally seem to make the decisions in the School Segregation cases
inevitable. The unanimity of the judges is remarkable. For lawyers familiar
with the views expressed, for example, by Mr. Justice Frankfurter concerning
judicial restraint the unanimity is trebly remarkable." It seems evident that
the burden rests upon opponents of the unanimous Court to establish that it
invaded the congressional domain. Those who acknowledge the substantive
correctness of the decisions (may their tribe increase) may rest assured that
oblique attacks, alleging judicial usurpation, are without merit. The Court
courageously carried out its historic function.
52 See Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 670 (1943). "Of course patriotism cannot be enforced by the flag salute. But
neither can the liberal spirit be enforced by judicial invalidation of illiberal legislation."
The dissent in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) by Justice Harlan also illustrates
this point of view.
In overruling the Wolf Case, the Court, in my opinion, has forgotten the
sense of judicial restraint which, with due regard for stare decisis, is one
element that should enter into deciding whether a past decision of this
Court should be overruled.
